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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Criminal charges are rare, almost non-existent, for those who 
are licensed to kill. Those cases that are charged rarely result in 
convictions. At common law, police officers were essentially given 
such a license; they were “allowed the use of whatever force was 
necessary to effect the arrest of a fleeing felon.”1 The United States 
Supreme Court imposed some level of restriction on that license by 
holding that deadly force “may not be used unless it is necessary to 
                                                 
1. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 12 (1985). 
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prevent the escape” of a felon “and the officer has probable cause 
to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or 
serious physical injury to the officer or others.”2 However, since 
Garner was a civil case, the States remained free to determine under 
what circumstances officers can be held criminally liable for using 
deadly force.3 Almost all states still provide immense protection for 
officers who use deadly force on civilians under certain 
circumstances.4 According to the United States Supreme Court, that 
standard is whether the use of force was “reasonable” as determined 
“from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene.”5 This 
standard provides great deference to police officers because of their 
need to “make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are 
tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force 
that is necessary in a particular situation.”6 
The result of this standard has been a series of “lawful but 
awful” incidents, as Chuck Wexler, executive director of the Police 
Executive Research Forum refers to them.7 What this morbid phrase 
refers to is “the most controversial police shooting incidents.” 8 
Lawful in the sense that “the shooting may be legally justified,” but 
awful in that “there were missed opportunities to ratchet down the 
encounter, to slow things down, to call in additional resources, in 
the minutes before the shooting occurred.”9 But even in these awful 
situations, the shooting may be lawful because it was what a 
“reasonable officer on the scene” would do “in light of the facts and 
circumstances confronting them.” 10  To date, charging decisions 
related to officer-involved shootings that result in civilian death and 
                                                 
2. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985). 
3. See People v. Couch, 461 N.W.2d 683, 684 (Mich. 1990) (stating that the 
United States Supreme Court lacks authority to require states to make shooting 
non-dangerous fleeing felons a crime, nor did it express a desire to). 
4. Chad Flanders & Joseph C Welling, Police Use of Deadly Force: State 
Statutes 30 Years after Garner, ST. LOUIS U. L. J., (2016) 
http://www.slu.edu/colleges/law/journal/police-use-of-deadly-force-state-
statues-30-years-after-garner/#_ftn12. 
5. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 486, 396 (1989). 
6. Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. 
7. Tribune News Services, Law enforcement leaders examine new use-of-force 
principles, CHICAGO TRIB. (2016) 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-police-use-of-force-
20160201-story.html. 
8. Re-engineering Police Training, p.3 
9. Re-engineering Police Training, p.3 (emphasis included). 
10. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97. 
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any cases that have dealt with the issue have used the 
“reasonableness” standard laid out in Graham. Determining what 
action an officer in a specific situation would have found reasonable 
has included taking an officer’s training and experience into 
consideration. Further, Supreme Court decisions have narrowed the 
analysis such that any “reasonableness” determination must focus 
on the precise moment the officer applies deadly force. 
The Supreme Court’s decisions on how to analyze whether a 
police officer is liable for his or her use of deadly force present a 
complex issue for district attorneys contemplating criminal charges. 
Specifically, the rulings made by the Court all pertain to alleged 
civil rights violations under the Fourth Amendment. As such, the 
Court has directed that for civil lawsuits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983, a police officer’s conduct must be evaluated using the same 
“reasonableness” standard listed in the Fourth Amendment. 
However, criminal cases are different from civil cases. While a 
defense to a deprivation of constitutional rights claim is whether the 
actions by a public official were constitutional, defenses to criminal 
charges usually take the form of justification and, like the criminal 
laws themselves, are determined by the states. What remains 
unclear is how the Supreme Court’s decisions are to be taken when 
determining whether an officer is immune from criminal 
prosecution for a homicide or assault on the grounds of self-defense 
or other justification. 
This Article will briefly summarize the context and legal basis 
of the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in police use of 
force cases in Part II. In Part III, this Article will address the 
difference between civil and criminal cases and discuss the general 
principles of justification as a defense to criminal prosecution. 
Finally, Part IV will argue that the analysis articulated by the 
Supreme Court in police use of force cases is instructive but not 
controlling for how prosecutors and state courts should analyze the 
criminal liability of police officers for certain actions. This 
argument will be based on the fact that the legal defense of 
justification to a criminal prosecution differs in significant ways 
from the legal issues presented in Fourth Amendment civil rights 
cases. 
3
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II. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON 
POLICE USE OF FORCE LAWSUITS 
Over the course of time, the United States Supreme Court has 
heard a number of cases regarding a police officer’s use of force 
against a civilian—both when that force has resulted in death and 
when the force was alleged to be excessive but not fatal. Most of 
these cases arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a civil 
cause of action for the deprivation of rights. Specifically, the statute 
says that: 
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen 
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to 
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by 
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.11 
As stated by the Supreme Court, “[t]he purpose of § 1983 is to 
deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive 
individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief 
to victims if such deterrence fails.” 12  The federal statute was 
enacted: 
to override certain kinds of state laws, to provide a remedy where 
state law was inadequate, to provide a federal remedy where the state 
remedy, although adequate in theory, was not available in practice, 
and to provide a remedy in the federal courts supplementary to any 
remedy any State might have.13  
Thus, when a government official acts to deprive a citizen of a 
constitutional right, that citizen may seek damages pursuant to § 
1983. This statute is often the basis for lawsuits against police 
officers for their use of force. 
                                                 
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
12. Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992) (citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 
247, 254–57 (1978)). 
13. McNeese v. Bd. of Ed. for Cmty. Unit School Dist., 187, 373 U.S. 668, 672 
(1963) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
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A.  Tennessee v. Garner: The Beginning 
One of the earliest and most commonly referenced cases on a 
police officer’s authority to use deadly force is the Supreme Court’s 
1985 decision, Tennessee v. Garner. 14  On October 3, 1974, 
Memphis Police Officers Elton Hymon and Leslie Wright 
responded to a “prowler inside call.”15 When they arrived at the 
scene, a woman was standing on her porch pointing at the house 
next door and stated that she heard glass breaking, which led her to 
believe that someone was breaking in. 16  Officer Hymon went 
behind the house while Officer Wright radioed in to dispatch.17 
Officer Hymon heard a door slam and saw someone run across the 
backyard, eventually spotting Edward Garner in front of a 6-foot-
high chain link fence at the end of the yard.18 Using his flashlight, 
Officer Hymon could see Garner’s face and hands and saw no 
weapon.19 He later said he was “reasonably sure” or “figured” that 
Garner was unarmed.20 Officer Hymon announced that he was a 
police officer and called for Garner to halt, taking a few steps 
forward.21 Garner began to climb the fence, and Officer Hymon, 
worried that Garner may elude capture, shot him in the back of the 
head.22 Garner later died on a hospital operating table.23 
At the time, a Tennessee statute allowed officers to “use all 
necessary means to effect the arrest” of a suspect who is fleeing after 
the officer announces his presence. 24  The Memphis Police 
Department’s policy “was slightly more restrictive than the statute, 
but still allowed the use of deadly force in cases of burglary.”25 No 
criminal action was ever filed, nor did the Memphis Police 
Firearm’s Review Board institute disciplinary action.26 
                                                 
14. 471 U.S. 1 (1985). 






21. Id. at 4. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-7-108 (1982)). 
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Seeking redress for his son’s death, Garner’s father brought an 
action for damages under § 1983. 27  The complaint alleged that 
Officer Hymon’s act of shooting Garner violated the Fourth, Fifth, 
Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution.28 The District Court dismissed the claim, concluding 
that Officer Hymon’s actions were authorized by Tennessee statute, 
that Officer Hymon “had employed the only reasonable and 
practicable means of preventing Garner’s escape,” and that “Garner 
had ‘recklessly and heedlessly attempted to vault over the fence to 
escape, thereby assuming the risk of being fired upon.’”29 The Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that Officer Hymon had 
“acted in good-faith reliance on the Tennessee statute and was 
therefore within the scope of his qualified immunity.”30 The case 
was remanded, however, to determine whether the use of deadly 
force in these circumstances was constitutional, among other issues 
regarding the City’s liability. 31  The Court of Appeals reversed, 
finding that killing a fleeing suspect is a seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment, and thus, only constitutional if the killing is 
“reasonable.”32 According to the appellate court, since the statute 
did not limit deadly force by distinguishing between felonies of 
different magnitudes, it was not reasonable.33 
The Supreme Court began its analysis by explaining that 
“[w]henever an officer restrains the freedom of a person to walk 
away, he has seized that person.” 34  As such, “there can be no 
question that apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure.”35 
Thus, the use of deadly force implicates the Fourth Amendment, 
which protect people from “unreasonable searches and seizures.”36 
Thus, for Fourth Amendment purposes, the use of deadly force is 
subject to the requirement that it be “reasonable.”37 To determine 
the constitutionality of seizures, courts “must balance the nature and 





31. Id. at 6. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 7 (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975)). 
35. Garner, 471 U.S. at 7. 
36. Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
37. Garner, 471 U.S. at 7. 
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quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment 
interests against the importance of the governmental interests 
alleged to justify the intrusion.”38 Balancing competing interests is 
seen as “the key principle of the Fourth Amendment.”39 In Garner, 
the Court balanced a “suspect’s fundamental interest in his [or her] 
own life” against the “governmental interests in effective law 
enforcement.”40 
In balancing these interests, the Court held that “[t]he use of 
deadly force to prevent the escape of all felony suspects, whatever 
the circumstances, is constitutionally unreasonable” and that 
“where the suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no 
threat to others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him 
[or her] does not justify the use of deadly force to do so.” 41 
However, “[w]here the officer has probable cause to believe that the 
suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer 
or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape 
by using deadly force.”42 In other words, it does not violate the 
Fourth Amendment to seize a fleeing suspect by using deadly force 
to prevent the escape of a suspect who poses a threat of serious 
physical harm. 
Ultimately, the Court held that Officer Hymon’s seizure of 
Garner through use of deadly force was not reasonable because 
“Officer Hymon could not reasonably have believed that Garner—
young, slight, and unarmed—posed any threat.”43 By the time the 
case got to the Supreme Court, however, the complaint against 
Officer Hymon had already dismissed and his personal civil liability 
had not been an issue raised. As such, the Court’s holding was 
limited to the fact that the statute purporting to give Officer Hymon 
the authority to use deadly force in that situation was 
unconstitutional and invalid under the Fourth Amendment.44 
                                                 
38. Id. at 8 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)). 
39. Garner, 471 U.S. at 8 (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 
n.12 (1981)). 
40. 471 U.S. at 9. 
41. Id. at 11. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 21. 
44. See Id. at 22. 
 
7
Shah: Licensed to Kill? An Analysis of the Standard for Assessing Law E
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2018
8 MITCHELL HAMLINE L.J. PUB. POL’Y & PRAC. [39 
 
B.  Graham v. Connor: Elaborating “Reasonableness” 
Four years after Garner, the famous and again, often-cited 
language of Graham v. Connor was written by the Court.45 Quotes 
from Graham are often used in discussions regarding review of a 
police officer’s conduct, both in civil and criminal cases. Graham 
instructs that “[t]he ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force 
must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the 
scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”46 “‘Not every 
push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of 
a judge’s chambers’ violates the Fourth Amendment.”47 Instead, 
“[t]he calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the 
fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second 
judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly 
evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular 
situation.”48 As such, the Court held that “reasonableness” inquiries 
in excessive force cases must be objective. 49  The question “is 
whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of 
the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to 
their underlying intent or motivation.”50 
However, the context of this decision is just as important as the 
decision itself. The issue presented to the Court was “what 
constitutional standard governs a free citizen’s claim that law 
enforcement officials used excessive force in the course of making 
an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of his person.”51  
On November 12, 1984, Dethorne Graham, who was diabetic, 
felt that he was beginning to have an insulin reaction and called his 
friend, William Berry, to drive him to a nearby store to purchase 
some orange juice to counter the reaction.52 When they arrived at 
the store and Graham entered, he saw that there was a long line at 
check-out and, concerned about the delay, left the store and asked 
                                                 
45. 490 U.S. 386 (1989). 
46. Id. at 396. 
47. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)), cert. 
denied, 414 U.S. 1033. 
48. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97. 
49. Id. at 397. 
50. Id. 
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Berry to take him to a friend’s house instead.53 Officer Connor saw 
Graham go in and out of the store and became suspicious, so he 
followed Berry’s car.54 About a half-mile from the store, Officer 
Connor pulled the car over. 55  Officer Connor told Berry and 
Graham that they had to wait while he figured out what happened at 
the convenience store, despite the fact that Berry said that Graham 
was simply having an insulin reaction. 56  As Officer Connor 
returned to his patrol car to request backup, Graham got out of 
Berry’s car, ran around it twice, sat down on the curb, and passed 
out.57 
A number of other officers arrived on scene and one rolled 
Graham over on the sidewalk, cuffing his hands tightly behind his 
back.58 Despite Berry’s pleas to get Graham some sugar, the officer 
said “I’ve seen a lot of people with sugar diabetes that never acted 
like this. Ain’t nothing wrong with the M.F. but drunk. Lock the 
S.B. up.”59 The officers carried Graham to Berry’s car, slammed his 
face on the hood, and eventually threw him into the back of a squad 
car.60 During the encounter, Graham sustained a broken foot, cuts 
on his wrists, a bruised forehead, and an injured shoulder, and 
claimed to have a loud ringing in his right ear.61 
Graham sued the individual officers under § 1983 alleging that 
the officers had used excessive force against him in violation of his 
Fourteenth Amendment rights.62 The Supreme Court rejected the 
idea that there was a “single generic standard” to govern excessive 
force claims under § 1983 because that section “‘is not itself a 
source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method for 
vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’”63 Instead, a § 1983 
analysis must begin by “identifying the specific constitutional right 
allegedly infringed by the challenged application of force.”64 The 
                                                 
53. Id. at 388–89. 







61. Id. at 390. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 393–94 (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). 
64. Id. at 394. 
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Court recognized that in most cases, “that will be either the Fourth 
Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures of the 
person, or the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual 
punishments, which are the two primary sources of constitutional 
protection against physically abusive governmental conduct.” 65 
Most claims of excessive force that arise from an arrest or 
investigatory stop will be under the Fourth Amendment.66 Thus, the 
Court recognized that civil rights claims brought under § 1983 that 
allege excessive force by the police during a stop or arrest will 
almost always be Fourth Amendment claims and therefore need to 
be evaluated by the Fourth Amendment’s standard of 
“reasonableness,” as stated in Garner.67 
The Supreme Court explained that to determine whether a 
specific instance of force used is “‘reasonable’ under the Fourth 
Amendment,” courts must balance “the nature and quality of the 
intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interest against the 
countervailing governmental interests at stake.” 68  Again, the 
Court’s language indicates that this is the standard for Fourth 
Amendment claims in particular. After announcing this standard 
and using the famed language about analyzing officers’ actions 
listed above, the Court remanded the case for reconsideration 
“under the proper Fourth Amendment standard.”69 
C.  Jumping Forward: Mullenix v. Luna 
The Supreme Court has continued to hear cases brought under 
§ 1983 alleging that police officers used excessive force since 
Graham and continued to use the “reasonableness” standard for 
those implicating the Fourth Amendment. A full discussion of each 
of these cases is beyond the scope of this Article. Instead, it will 
summarize a couple of the most recent Supreme Court cases dealing 
with police use of force and the analysis used there. 
Toward the end of 2015, the Supreme Court decided Mullenix 
v. Luna, which involved a police officer shooting and killing a man 
                                                 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. at 394–95. 
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in a vehicle.70 On March 23, 2010, Israel Leija, Jr., sped away from 
a Texas police officer who approached him to arrest him on a 
warrant. 71  Texas police officers and troopers from the Texas 
Department of Public Safety quickly took chase after Leija.72 As 
Leija was driving, he called the police dispatcher, “claiming to have 
a gun and threatening to shoot at police officers if they did not 
abandon their pursuit.”73 These threats were relayed to the officers 
in the field, along with a report that Leija might be intoxicated.74 
Officers set up spike strips in three locations, one of which was 
beneath an overpass that Leija was expected to pass through. 75 
Trooper Chadrin Mullenix of the Department of Public Safety 
arrived at that overpass and, upon seeing spike strips set up, began 
to consider shooting Leija’s car to disable it.76 Trooper Mullenix 
“had not received training in this tactic and had not attempted it 
before, but he radioed” the idea to his supervisor to see if it was an 
idea “worth doing.”77 However, before receiving a response from 
his supervisor, Trooper Mullenix got out of his squad “and, armed 
with his service rifle, took a shooting position on the overpass.”78 
There was some debate as to whether or not Trooper Mullenix was 
able to hear his supervisor’s response, directing him to wait to see 
if the spike strips would work first.79 While he waited for Leija’s 
vehicle, Trooper Mullenix was informed that there were other 
officers below the overpass.80 About three minutes after he took a 
position to shoot, Trooper Mullenix saw Leija’s vehicle and fired 
six shots as the vehicle approached the overpass. 81  Leija’s car 
continued forward and under the overpass, “where it engaged the 
spike strip, hit the median, and rolled two and a half times.”82 Leija 
was found dead, and it was determined that the cause of death was 
                                                 
70. 136 S.Ct. 305 (2015). 






77. Id. at 306–07. 
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the shots from Trooper Mullenix’s firearm, four of which had hit 
Leija in the upper body.83 None of the shots appeared to have hit the 
car’s radiator, hood, or engine block—the places that Trooper 
Mullenix would have had to hit to disable the car.84 
Leija’s representatives sued Trooper Mullenix under § 1983, 
alleging a violation of the Fourth Amendment for the use of 
excessive force against Leija. 85  Trooper Mullenix’s motion for 
summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity was 
denied by the district court and the denial was affirmed on appeal.86 
When Trooper Mullenix sought a rehearing, the Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals denied it, but two judges withdrew their previous 
opinions to issue a new one.87 “The revised opinion recognized that 
objective unreasonableness is a question of law that can be resolved 
on summary judgment . . . but reaffirmed the denial of qualified 
immunity.”88 The new majority opinion found that the trooper’s use 
of force was “objectively unreasonable because several of the 
factors that had justified deadly force in previous cases were absent 
here: There were no innocent bystanders, Leija’s driving was 
relatively controlled,” and Trooper Mullenix’s decision was not a 
split-second judgment.89 Additionally, the court denied qualified 
immunity because it found that “the law was clearly established 
such that a reasonable officer would have known that the use of 
deadly force, absent a sufficiently substantial and immediate threat, 
violated the Fourth Amendment.”90 
The Supreme Court reviewed only the qualified immunity issue 
and not whether there was a violation of the Fourth Amendment.91 
As stated by the court, “the doctrine of qualified immunity shields 
officials from civil liability so long as their conduct does not violate 
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known.”92 This immunity protects 
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public officials from civil liability for alleged constitutional 
violations. A right is clearly established when it is “sufficiently clear 
that every reasonable official would have understood that what he 
[or she] is doing violates that right.”93 The Court acknowledged that 
police use of force cases almost always depends on the specific facts 
of the case, and that officers generally receive qualified immunity 
whenever there is no case that “squarely governs” the same facts as 
those present in the case being heard.94 In other words, unless there 
is a case that is almost directly factually on point with a case being 
heard, the officer will almost always receive the benefit of qualified 
immunity. Here, the Court held that “excessive force cases 
involving car chases reveal the hazy legal backdrop against which 
Mullenix acted,” so the trooper could not have been expected to 
know that shooting from an overpass may violate a constitutional 
right. 95  While the Supreme Court did not reach the issue of 
“reasonableness” in Mullenix, it is important to note that the case 
was brought as an alleged Fourth Amendment violation under § 
1983, similar to Graham. 
D.  Clarifying Qualified Immunity: Pauly v. White 
The most recent Supreme Court case regarding a police officer’s 
use of deadly force was decided on January 9, 2017.96 Daniel Pauly 
was involved in a road-rage incident on a highway in New Mexico 
and two women called 911 to report him as a “drunk driver” who 
had been “swerving all crazy.”97 The women followed Daniel on 
the highway, until he pulled over at an off-ramp, confronted them, 
then got back in his truck and drove “to a secluded house where he 
lived with his brother, Samuel Pauly.”98 Officers Kevin Truesdale, 
Ray White, and Michael Mariscal responded to the off-ramp the two 
women had called 911 from, and used the license plate number 
provided by the two women to locate the Pauly brothers’ address.99 
Officers Truesdale and Mariscal then went to the Pauly residence to 
                                                 
93. Reichle v. Howards, 132 S.Ct. 2088, 2093 (2012). 
94. Mullenix, 136 S.Ct. at 309 (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201 
(2004)) (emphasis included). 
95. Mullenix, 136 S.Ct. at 309–10. 
96. Pauly v. White, 137 S.Ct. 548 (2017). 
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get Daniel’s side of the story, while Officer White remained at the 
off-ramp in case Daniel returned.100 Neither Officer Truesdale nor 
Officer Mariscal turned on their squad lights as they approached the 
Pauly residence.101 
Upon arriving at the residence, the officers realized that there 
were two different houses.102 There were no lights on inside the first 
house, and the second house was located behind the first, on a 
hill.103 Lights were on in the second house.104 The officers parked 
by the first house and covertly approached the second house, using 
flashlights intermittently.105 When they got to the front door of the 
second house, Officer Truesdale turned on his flashlight, they 
discovered Daniel’s pickup truck, and saw two men moving around 
inside.106 At this point, the officers radioed Officer White, who left 
the off-ramp to join them.107 
There was an exchange around 11:00 p.m., where the Pauly 
brothers realized that the officers were outside and yelled out, 
asking who was at the door.108 The officers yelled back in to open 
the door, that the house was surrounded, and that the officers would 
be coming in.109 Through the closed door, neither Pauly brother 
could hear the officers identify themselves as police.110 One of the 
brothers then yelled back that they were armed inside the house.111 
Officers Truesdale and Mariscal saw someone running to the back 
of the house and yelled to the brothers to come outside.112 
Officer White arrived at the first house and was approaching the 
front door when he heard the shouting from the second house.113 He 
went over to the Paulys’ house and arrived just in time to hear the 










109. Id. at 549–50. 






Mitchell Hamline Law Journal of Public Policy and Practice, Vol. 39 [2018], Art. 1
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/policypractice/vol39/iss1/1
Dec. 2017] Shah 15 
 
brothers announce that they were armed.114  In response, Officer 
White “drew his gun and took cover behind a stone wall 50 feet 
from the front of the house.”115 Officer Mariscal found cover behind 
a pickup truck.116 Daniel then stepped out of the back door and fired 
two shotgun blasts, followed by Samuel opening the front window 
and pointing a handgun towards Officer White.117 Officer Mariscal 
shot at Samuel and missed, but Officer White shot four to five 
seconds later and killed Samuel.118 
Samuel’s estate and Daniel sued the individual officers, alleging 
in part that the officers were liable under § 1983 for violating 
Samuel’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive 
force.119 All three officers moved for summary judgment based on 
qualified immunity, with Officer White arguing that his use of force 
did not violate the Fourth Amendment “and, regardless, that 
Samuel’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from deadly force 
under the circumstances of this case was not clearly established.”120 
The District Court denied qualified immunity and the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals affirmed that decision.121 The majority decided 
that a reasonable officer in Officer White’s shoes would have given 
a warning, especially since he was positioned behind a stone wall 
where he could not be shot unless he moved, and that the rule 
requiring a warning under those circumstances was clearly 
established at the time of Samuel’s death.122 
The Supreme Court reversed and held that Officer White did not 
violate clearly established law.123 According to the Court, since the 
Tenth Circuit had “failed to identify a case where an officer acting 
under similar circumstances as Officer White was held to have 
violated the Fourth Amendment,” that court had applied the “clearly 
established” rule incorrectly.124 Instead of using general terms to 
describe clearly established laws, “the clearly established law must 









122. Id. at 550–51. 
123. Id. at 551. 
124. Id. at 552. 
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be ‘particularized’ to the facts of the case.”125 Ultimately, the Court 
stated that: 
[c]learly established federal law does not prohibit a reasonable 
officer who arrives late to an ongoing police action in circumstances 
like this from assuming that proper procedures, such as officer 
identification, have already been followed. No settled Fourth 
Amendment principle requires that officer to second-guess the earlier 
steps already taken by his or her fellow officers in instances like the 
one White confronted here.126 
Thus, because no case with nearly identical facts to those at 
issue in White had determined that Samuel Pauly had a clearly 
established Fourth Amendment right to receive a warning before 
being shot, Officer White was entitled to qualified immunity. 
These four cases highlight the high standard that the Supreme 
Court has determined governs whether a plaintiff can succeed in a 
§ 1983 case alleging excessive force by the police. However, as has 
been repeatedly stated, § 1983 cases are civil cases brought at a 
federal level to seek a remedy for a violation of a person’s 
constitutional rights. In cases where police officers are alleged to 
have used excessive force, the lawsuit is often brought with 
reference to the Fourth Amendment.127 
III.   DIFFERENTIATING CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS FROM 
CIVIL LAWSUITS AND DEFENSES TO CRIMINAL CHARGES 
A.  Separating Criminal and Civil Law 
There is a significant difference between civil cases and 
criminal cases. Civil cases are generally private disputes between 
individual persons or organizations.128 A person or entity claiming 
that another person or entity failed to fulfill a legal duty owed to the 
first person usually starts a civil case.129 A legal duty can include a 
duty to respect rights that are established under the Constitution, as 
                                                 
125. Id. (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). 
126. White, 137 S.Ct. at 552. 
127. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 394. 
128. See Civil Cases vs. Criminal Cases – Key Differences, FINDLAW, 
http://litigation.findlaw.com/filing-a-lawsuit/civil-cases-vs-criminal-cases-key-
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well as those established from federal or state laws.130 Civil suits 
generally relate to settling disputes between private parties,131 often 
seeking to collect money owed or compensation for damages.132 
Section 1983 claims fit firmly within this category—private parties 
allege that public officials violated a legal duty stemming from 
rights under the Constitution and the party suing seeks 
compensation for resulting damages bring them. As seen from the 
cases above, qualified immunity is sometimes a defense to civil 
cases. Additionally, the Supreme Court has historically analyzed 
Fourth Amendment cases by the “reasonableness” of the official’s 
conduct since the Fourth Amendment only protects from 
“unreasonable” searches and seizures. 
In contrast, criminal law is based on state systems of laws 
designating crimes and focused on punishment of individuals who 
violate those laws.133 A crime is “any act or omission in violation of 
a law prohibiting it, or omitted in violation of a law ordering it.”134 
Generally, criminal cases “involve an action that is considered to be 
harmful to society as a whole.”135 Thus, while civil cases are based 
on a wrong against a specific person, criminal cases are based on 
actions that wrong all of society. Another key difference between 
criminal and civil cases is who brings the case. The victim of a crime 
has no responsibility to bring the case.136 Instead, the government—
local, state, or federal—brings the case on behalf of the citizens of 
the community (the city, state, or United States).137 Criminal law 
has its own set of defenses determined by statute that differs greatly 
from those available in civil law.138 
                                                 
130. Id. 
131. See Civil Law, WEX LEGAL DICTIONARY, https://www.law.cornell.edu/ 
wex/civil_law (last visited Dec. 11, 2017). 
132. http://sheriff.org/faqs/displayfaq.cfm?id=ba787291-0b05-4ab2-9840-
b9697bba4cce. 
133. See Criminal Law, WEX LEGAL DICTIONARY, 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/criminal_law (last visited Dec. 11, 2017). 
134. Id. 
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B.  Justification Defenses in Criminal Prosecutions 
It should be noted at the outset that this Article does not seek to 
act as a definitive guide to justification defenses in criminal law 
prosecutions. Rather, this Article seeks only to touch on the basics 
of justification defenses to analyze how they differ from the 
constitutional defenses used in § 1983 deprivation of civil rights 
claims. 
A justification defense is a type of affirmative defense; the 
defendant acknowledges that the crime occurred but argues that he 
or she should not be held criminally liable because the act was 
justified. The burden is on the defendant to assert the defense, and 
the prosecution must disprove one of the elements of the defense 
beyond a reasonable doubt.139 Justification defenses have specific 
elements that must be met for them to be asserted successfully in a 
criminal case. First, there must be a triggering condition that 
authorizes the author to act under a justification. 140  Essentially, 
there must be some set of circumstances that exist that allows the 
actor’s action to be justified.141 There are several different types of 
justifications, each of which involve different triggering 
conditions.142 For example, defensive force justifications concern 
threats of harm to a particular interest.143 In self-defense cases, this 
involves a threat to the actor seeking to use the defense.144 Other 
examples could be threats to other persons or to property.145 Public 
authority justifications, in contrast, permit authorized public 
officials to engage in conduct that would otherwise be a criminal 
offense when needed to protect or further a public interest.146 In 
those situations, public officials may act affirmatively to defend 
public or private interests, assuming they act within the realm of 
their authority.147 
Second, for a justification defense to apply, the response “must 
be necessary to protect or further the interest at stake,” and can only 
                                                 
139. 6 Am. Jur. 2d Assault and Battery § 64. 
140. § 121 Justifications—Generally, 2 Crim. L. Def. § 121. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
143. § 131 Defensive force defenses—Generally, 2 Crim. L. Def. § 131. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. 
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cause “a harm that is proportional or reasonable in relation to the 
harm threatened or the interest to be furthered.”148 The defense will 
only apply if the person acted “when and to the extent necessary to 
protect or further the interest at stake.”149 In other words, the person 
seeking to use the defense may only do so if his or her use of force 
was actually needed to defend from an immediate threat. 
Additionally, the defense will only be successful if the actor uses 
“that degree of force actually necessary for self-protection . . . the 
force used is not justified if the individual actor could protect 
himself effectively with less.” 150  Finally, the proportionality 
requirement “bars justification when the harm caused by the actor 
may be necessary to protect or further the interest at stake, but is too 
severe in relation to the value of that interest.”151 This requirement 
essentially requires a balancing of the harm threatened against the 
harm inflicted by the actor. If the latter outweighs the former, then 
the action is not justified. 
As mentioned above, there are several types of justification 
defenses to criminal prosecutions. The application of each of these 
defenses depends on the circumstances of each case. The 
justifications most relevant in cases where police officers use deadly 
force against civilians are the doctrines of self-defense, defense of 
others, or public authority. 
1. Self-Defense 
The courts and the law have long recognized that one may act 
to defend himself when attacked. 152  In fact, “[e]very American 
Jurisdiction provides a justification of self-defense in one form or 
another.”153 Essentially, force that would be considered a criminal 
offense is justified if the aggressor (or victim) unlawfully threatens 
the actor (or criminal defendant).154 The actor may then act only 
when necessary and to the extent necessary for self-protection, and 
only when the harm caused by the actor would be proportionate to 
                                                 
148. 2 Crim. L. Def. § 121 (emphasis included). 
149. Id. (emphasis added). 
150. Id. 
151. Id. 
152. Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921). 
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the harm threatened by the aggressor.155 If the actor provokes the 
aggressor to attack him, the self-defense justification will not 
apply.156 Some jurisdictions may require that the actor attempt to 
retreat from the situation before the use of force in self-defense is 
justified.157 However, that duty to retreat may not apply to public 
officials who are “using force in the performance of his [or her] 
duties” and officials who are “justified in using force in making an 
arrest or preventing an escape [are] not obliged to desist from efforts 
to perform such duty.”158 
Theoretically, the self-defense justification would be available 
to a police officer in almost the same way that it would apply to any 
other citizen. So long as the officer does not provoke an individual 
into attacking, if that individual attacks the officer then the officer 
may use a proportional amount of force to defend against the attack. 
Where this justification differs when applied to police officers is in 
the duty to retreat. If the officer is seeking to make an arrest or 
prevent an escape, the officer may not have to retreat but could 
instead use force to defend against the attack and effect the arrest, 
even where a civilian would have been required to retreat. This, of 
course, will depend on the laws that the specific state where the 
incident occurred. 
What the self-defense justification would not allow, however, is 
for a police officer to use deadly force against an attack where the 
aggressor is not using deadly force against the officer. For example, 
if an individual punches a police officer, that officer is not justified 
in shooting and killing the individual. The self-defense doctrine 
allows only the use of proportional force, which turns on the 
balancing of harms. While many would argue that there is a strong 
public interest in allowing police officers to use the force necessary 
to enable them to do their jobs, it strains common sense to say that 
the harm caused by killing a civilian adequately balances against the 
harm caused by punching a police officer. This is especially true 
when the harm to society is considered. Over the past few years, 
there have been many instances where police officers shot and killed 
individuals in situations where those individuals were not using 
                                                 
155. Id. 
156. Model Penal Code § 3.04(2)(b)(i). 
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deadly force against the officer. 159  Each time this happens, 
community trust for law enforcement takes a hit. While there is a 
public interest in allowing police officers to do their jobs, there is 
also a strong public interest in ensuring good relations between 
communities and the officers that police them. Thus, it is unlikely 
that an officer’s use of force against an individual who does not 
attack with deadly force will be justified under the doctrine of self-
defense. 
2. Defense of Others 
The common law recognized that the use of force in defense of 
another was usually a valid defense to a charge of assault.160 Again, 
“[n]early every American jurisdiction recognizes a justification for 
the defense of other persons.”161 Essentially, one is justified in using 
force against an aggressor to protect a third person if: (1) the actor 
would be justified “in using such force to protect himself against the 
injury he believes to be threatened to the person whom he seeks to 
protect;” (2) the third person would be justified in using protective 
force; (3) and the actor believes that intervention is necessary to 
protect the third person.162 One difference from the self-defense 
justification is that the actor is not required to retreat unless he 
knows that doing so would secure the safety of the third person.163 
However, if retreat of the third person is possible, the actor is 
                                                 
159. See e.g., Larry Buchanan, Ford Fessenden, K.K. Rebecca Lai, Haeyoun 
Park, Alicia Parlapiano, Archie Tse, Tim Wallace, Derek Watkins & Karen 
Yourish, What Happened in Ferguson? N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2015) 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/13/us/ferguson-missouri-town-
under-siege-after-police-shooting.html?_r=0; What we know about the death of 
Jamar Clark, STAR TRIB. (Mar. 30, 2016) http://www.startribune.com/what-we-
know-about-the-death-of-jamar-clark/353199331/; Al Baker, J. David Goodman 
& Benjamin Mueller, Beyond The Chokehold: The Path to Eric Garner’s Death, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 15, 2015) https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/14/nyregion/eric-
garner-police-chokehold-staten-island.html; Merideth Edwards & Dakin 
Andone, Ex-South Carolina cop Michael Slager gets 20 years for Walter Scott 
Killing, CNN (Dec. 7, 2017) http://www.cnn.com/2017/12/07/us/michael-slager-
sentencing/index.html.  
160. United States v. Grimes, 413 F.2d 1376, 1379 (7th Cir. 1969) (citing 6 Am. 
Jur. 2d, Assault and Battery, § 63). 
161. § 133 Defense of others, 2 Crim. L. Def. § 133. 
162. Model Penal Code § 3.05. See also 2 Crim. L. Def. § 133. 
163. Model Penal Code § 3.05, Explanatory Note. 
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required to try to convince that person to retreat before using 
force.164 Again, like self-defense, the actor may only use force when 
and to the extent necessary to protect the third person, and such 
force must be proportional to the harm threatened.165 
For similar reasons to self-defense, it seems that police officers’ 
reliance on the defense of others justification as an affirmative 
defense to criminal prosecution is limited. The defense only applies 
when the actor would be justified in acting in self-defense if he or 
she were in the place of the third person. Further, the restrictions of 
necessity and proportionality are still in play. Under these 
limitations, it once again appears that the defense of others 
justification would only apply to officers who use deadly force 
when the aggressor was using deadly force against a third person. 
3. Public Authority Justification 
In contrast to self-defense and defense of others, the public 
authority justification protects affirmative use of force, rather than 
limiting its protection to reactive use of force.166 Public authority 
justifications apply when the actor is “specifically authorized to 
engage in the conduct constituting the offense in order to protect or 
further a public interest.”167 Generally speaking, the elements of a 
public authority defense are that: (1) the actor has been granted 
public authority; (2) there is a need for action to protect or further 
the particular interests at stake; and (3) the actor engages in conduct 
that would otherwise be an offense, consistent with his authority.168 
Public authority differs from the self-defense and defense of others 
doctrines in that it is limited only to those who have been granted 
the authority to act in specified ways, rather than to the world at 
large.169 Law enforcement officers receive some form of authority 
in every state to act in ways that may otherwise be offenses if 
committed by civilians.170 
                                                 
164. Id. 
165. 2 Crim. L. Def. § 133. 




170. § 142 Law enforcement authority, 2 Crim. L. Def. § 142. 
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Public authorization to use deadly force is a proverbial “license 
to kill” under certain circumstances. State law generally defines the 
specific situations under which law enforcement officers may use 
deadly force. The Model Penal Code offers an example of such a 
statutory scheme. 171  The Code begins by authorizing law 
enforcement officers to use the amount of force that appears to be 
“immediately necessary” in order to effect a lawful arrest.172 The 
next section is titled “Limitations on the Use of Force,” and includes 
a section about deadly force.173 The Model Penal Code provides that 
“[t]he use of deadly force is not justifiable under this Section 
unless” the arrest is for a felony and is being made by a law 
enforcement officer, the officer believes the force used will not 
create a risk of injury to bystanders.174 Further, the officer must 
believe that “the crime for which the arrest is made involved 
conduct including the use or threatened use of deadly force” or that 
“there is a substantial risk that the person to be arrested will cause 
death or serious bodily injury if his apprehension is delayed.”175 The 
Code authorizes law enforcement officers to use deadly force but 
only under very specific circumstances. This is especially evident 
because that authorization falls under a section defining limitations 
on the use of force, rather than one giving blanket authorizations.176 
The language authorizing use of deadly force by law 
enforcement officers differs from state to state, with some states 
taking on similar restrictive language as the Model Penal Code and 
others granting more broad authority to law enforcement. Florida 
law says that officers are “justified in the use of any force” that the 
officer “reasonably believes to be necessary to defend himself or 
herself or another from bodily harm while making the arrest” and 
when the use of force is used to capture escaped felons or arrest 
fleeing felons. 177  In California, “[h]omicide is justifiable when 
committed by public officers [ . . . ] in obedience to any judgment 
of a competent Court,” when necessary to overcome resistance to 
the performance of a legal duty, or “[w]hen necessarily committed 
                                                 
171. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07. 





177. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.05 (West 1997). 
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in retaking felons who have been rescued or have escaped, or when 
necessarily committed in arresting persons charged with felony, and 
who are fleeing from justice or resisting such arrest.”178 
Texas authorizes law enforcement officers to use force in 
making lawful arrest or conducting a lawful search after identifying 
himself or herself as a peace officer and “manifests his purpose to 
arrest or search.”179 Use of deadly force, after those pre-requisites 
have been met, is authorized “when and to the degree the peace 
officer reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately 
necessary to make an arrest, or to prevent escape after arrest.”180 
Further, the officer must believe that “the conduct for which arrest 
is authorized included the use or attempted use of deadly force; or 
[ . . . ] there is a substantial risk that the person to be arrested will 
cause death or serious bodily injury to the actor or another if the 
arrest is delayed.”181 Under Texas law, law enforcement officers do 
not have a duty to retreat before using deadly force in the 
circumstances listed.182 However, the statute also says, “[d]eadly 
force may only be used under the circumstances enumerated in 
Subsections (c) and (d).”183  A separate section authorizes peace 
officers and correctional facility guards to use deadly force when 
“immediately necessary to prevent the escape of a person from the 
correctional facility.”184 
New York authorizes law enforcement officers to use force to 
effect an arrest or prevent an escape from custody “to the extent he 
or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to effect the arrest, 
or to prevent the escape from custody, or in self-defense or to defend 
a third person from what he or she reasonably believes to be the use 
or imminent use of physical force.”185 However, the law continues, 
stating, “that deadly physical force may be used for such purposes 
only” under enumerated circumstances.186 First, law enforcement is 
                                                 
178. CAL. PENAL CODE § 196. 
179. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.51(a) (West 1994). 
180. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.51(c) (West 1994). 
181. Id. 
182. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.51(e) (West 1994). 
183. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.51(g) (West 1994) (emphasis added) 
(Subsection d covers use of deadly force by civilians operating in a peace 
officer’s presence and at the peace officer’s direction). 
184. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 9.52 (West 1994). 
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authorized to use deadly force if the offense was a felony or 
attempted felony that involves the use or threatened use of physical 
force, or if the offense was kidnapping, arson, first-degree escape, 
or first-degree burglary.187 Second, deadly force is authorized if the 
offense that was committed or attempted was a felony and the 
person was armed with a firearm or deadly weapon “in the course 
of resisting arrest therefor or attempting to escape from custody.”188 
Finally, “[r]egardless of the particular offense which is the subject 
of the arrest or attempted escape,” law enforcement officers may 
use deadly force when “necessary to defend the [officer] or another 
person from what the officer reasonably believe to be the use or 
imminent use of deadly physical force.”189 The New York law also 
provides that the use of deadly force as prescribed to effect an arrest 
or prevent an escape “does not constitute justification for reckless 
conduct by such police officer or peace officer amounting to an 
offense against or with respect to innocent persons whom he or she 
is not seeking to arrest or retain in custody.” 190  Thus, a law 
enforcement officer can still be held criminally liable if he or she 
injures an innocent bystander while using deadly force recklessly 
while trying to effect an arrest or prevent an escape. 
Finally, Minnesota law states that “the use of deadly force by a 
peace officer in the line of duty is justified only when necessary” 
under specific listed circumstances.191 First, an officer in Minnesota 
may use deadly force when necessary “to protect the peace officer 
or another from apparent death or great bodily harm.”192 Second, 
deadly force is authorized “to effect the arrest or capture, or prevent 
the escape, of a person whom the peace officer knows or has 
reasonable grounds to believe has committed or attempted to 
commit a felony involving the use or threatened use of deadly 
force.”193 Finally, Minnesota peace officers are justified in using 
deadly force when necessary “to effect the arrest or capture, or 
prevent the escape of a person” whom the officer reasonably 
believes has committed or attempted a felony “if the officer 




190. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.30, subdiv. 2 (McKinney 2004). 
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reasonably believes that the person will cause death or great bodily 
harm if the person’s apprehension is delayed.”194 
As noted, some of the state statutes discussed above contain 
limiting language regarding the use of deadly force by law 
enforcement officers. Even the statutes that started by giving law 
enforcement officers fairly broad authority to use force in general 
become more restrictive when enumerating specific conditions 
under which the use of deadly force will be justified. These are all 
examples of the public authority justification; the States grant law 
enforcement officers the authority use force, and deadly force, in 
certain situations. As long as those conditions or circumstances are 
met, the law enforcement officer can assert the public authority 
justification as a defense to criminal prosecution. Since this 
justification is more specific than general self-defense, and offers a 
higher level of protection to public authorities, this is likely where 
the defense will be raised. 
IV.   ANALYZING POLICE OFFICER’S CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
FOR USE OF DEADLY FORCE 
There is a fundamental difference between lawsuits against 
police officers for deprivations of civil rights under Section 1983 
and criminal prosecutions against the same officers. As discussed, 
Section 1983 is meant to redress the “deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.”195 
The goal of that federal law is to prevent government actors from 
using “the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their 
federally guaranteed rights.” 196  This is where the Fourth 
Amendment “reasonableness” standard comes into play. 197  The 
Fourth Amendment guards not against all searches and seizures, but 
against “unreasonable” searches and seizures. 198  Section 1983 
provides citizens with a civil remedy for violations of that 
constitutional right.199 However, such a violation only exists if the 
search or seizure was “unreasonable.” Thus, if it is determined that 
                                                 
194. Id. 
195. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996). 
196. Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 161. 
197. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
198. Id. 
199. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
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the officer’s action was reasonable, there is no violation of the 
Fourth Amendment and therefore no Section 1983 claim. 
State criminal law differs. Criminal laws proscribe certain 
actions that society—namely lawmakers—have decided should not 
be tolerated and seek to punish those individuals who violate the 
laws. However, crimes such as murder or manslaughter do not 
require a Fourth Amendment violation as an element that must be 
proven. Additionally, states have legislation that defines what 
specific, narrow defenses to crimes are. These defenses are 
embodied in laws that govern self-defense, defense of others, and 
justifiable or authorized use of force. 
A violation of criminal law exists when the conduct proscribed 
by the statute is committed. For example, the crime of murder is 
generally committed when a person intentionally causes the death 
of another person. Likewise, a defense to criminal prosecution is 
established when the circumstances listed under those defensive 
statutes are present. For example, when Person A attacks Person B 
with a deadly weapon without provocation, Person B may assert 
self-defense if he uses a deadly force back against Person A. 
Likewise, in most states, a police officer could assert a defense of 
authorized use of deadly force if it is necessary for the officer to 
prevent the escape of a person who committed a violent felony with 
a deadly weapon under most state laws. But in criminal law, these 
defenses are defined by statute. Most of those statutes do not include 
a provision authorizing law enforcement officers to use deadly force 
if doing so would be a reasonable seizure; instead, they lay out the 
specific circumstances where those officers’ use of deadly force 
would be authorized. 
When state legislatures have been explicit with what their laws 
are intended to cover, courts will generally decline to extend those 
laws to cover a broader scope, out of concern for a separation of 
powers issue. Essentially, courts say that if the legislature intended 
the statute to cover more, the lawmakers would have written the law 
to do so. This concept should apply with equal force to police 
officers’ use of deadly force. State legislatures have taken it upon 
themselves to write statutes that enumerate the circumstances under 
which police officers may use deadly force justifiably. Additionally, 
police officers might be able to rely on other statutory defenses 
available to the public at large, such as self-defense or defense of 
others, to the same extent as the statutes that apply only to law 
enforcement. It makes little sense to read the Fourth Amendment 
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standard into state criminal law when state legislatures chose not to 
include it. 
Further, state criminal laws apply to all persons in that state’s 
jurisdiction. The conduct proscribed by criminal laws is conduct 
that society, through its lawmakers has deemed so undesirable that 
it should be punishable by the state government. Murder and 
manslaughter are both covered by criminal laws and prohibit one 
person from killing another. However, the existence of statutory 
defenses like self-defense show that under specific sets of 
circumstances, society recognizes that such killing may be justified 
and should not be punished. Any citizen who kills another is eligible 
for punishment under the state’s criminal laws unless their situation 
fits one of those statutory defenses. 
Additionally, in almost every state, law enforcement officers 
have a separate law that justifies their use of deadly force under 
additional circumstances. If citizens can only be immunized from a 
state criminal law violation by meeting the elements of statutory 
defenses, then it only seems fair that law enforcement officers 
should only be immunized from criminal prosecution if they meet 
one of the statutory defenses as well. State legislatures, by creating 
separate statutes authorizing law enforcement officers’ use of 
deadly force in a broader set of circumstances, have already 
determined that law enforcement officers are different and should 
not be subject to criminal prosecutions for using deadly force in as 
many situations as civilians. Many of these statutes authorizing 
police officers to use deadly force incorporate the Garner standard. 
However, in the decades since Graham, few—if any—jurisdictions 
have incorporated the “reasonableness” standard into their statutes. 
These decisions are for the legislature, not for the courts or 
prosecutors. 
The statutes created by the legislature are the codification of the 
legislature’s decision. Prosecutors, in determining whether to 
charge a police officer with murder or manslaughter, should look to 
those statutes in assessing whether they can prove guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt and whether the officer would have a successful 
public authority justification defense. Likewise, in determining 
whether to dismiss a case for lack of probable cause or whether the 
officer was justified in using deadly force as a matter of law, judges 
should also rely on those same statutes. Justifications to criminal 
prosecutions, such as those codified in self-defense, defense of 
others, and other authorization statutes, are the qualifiers on 
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criminal liability. The lack of a constitutional violation under the 
Fourth Amendment has no bearing on whether an officer can be 
held criminally liable. 
Finally, state criminal laws are different from the Fourth and 
other Amendments in terms of whose conduct they restrict. State 
criminal laws proscribe certain types of conduct—murder, rape, 
robbery, drunk driving, and so on—for all persons present in that 
state. The Amendments to the Constitution, on the other hand, 
proscribe conduct by the government. While criminal laws say no 
person shall kill another, the Fourth Amendment says only that 
government officials should refrain from unreasonable searches and 
seizures. This is yet another indicator that the Constitution’s 
Amendments are separate from state criminal laws. 
Since Graham, Mullenix, and Pauly all involved § 1983 claims 
brought for the deprivation of civil rights, alleging Fourth 
Amendment violations, they do not have any direct applicability or 
precedential value in state criminal proceedings. These cases are 
still important, as they can and should be used by law enforcement, 
attorneys, and the courts to determine whether a police officer is 
civilly liable for damages under § 1983. The United States Supreme 
Court’s narrowing of the analysis, however, focusing only on the 
moment the officer used deadly force and restricting the factors that 
may be looked at, cannot be read in as a defense to criminal 
prosecution for the use of deadly force. State legislatures are free to 
codify these holdings into the statutes authorizing officers to use 
deadly force, as many states did after Garner. Until that happens, 
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and the courts must continue to rely 
on the state criminal laws and statutory defenses is assessing 
criminal liability of a law enforcement officer who uses deadly force 
against a civilian. 
V.   CONCLUSION 
In recent years, the media has shed a bright light on law 
enforcement officers’ use of deadly force and the lack of criminal 
prosecutions in those cases. Prosecutors, defense attorneys, and 
courts have often looked to cases evaluating civil liability by police 
officers for use of deadly force in federal civil rights cases brought 
under the Fourth Amendment. However, those civil actions for 
constitutional violations differ significantly from criminal 
29
Shah: Licensed to Kill? An Analysis of the Standard for Assessing Law E
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2018
30 MITCHELL HAMLINE L.J. PUB. POL’Y & PRAC. [39 
 
prosecutions brought under state laws with specific codified 
defenses. 
Graham did not seek to immunize police officers from criminal 
prosecutions nor did it proclaim to present a defense to such an 
action. Indeed, the language used throughout Graham shows that 
the Court was only concerned with constitutional violations under 
the Fourth Amendment in determining that case.200 Thus, Graham 
and its progeny have simply set forth what analysis should be used 
when determining if an officer who used deadly force violated the 
constitution. The analysis for criminal liability is different. State 
laws provide law enforcement officers with a license to kill under 
specific, limited, and enumerated circumstances. The criminal 
justice system should refrain from misreading Graham to extend 
that license to be a blanket immunity. 
 
                                                 
200. 490 U.S. at 396. 
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